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CAPITAL GAINS MYTHS
by John Lee
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John Lee is a professor of law at Marshall~Wythe
School of Law, College of William. & MClry, Wil~
liamsburg, Virginia.
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H.R. 1215, Contract with America Tax Relief Act of
1995 ("CWATRA"), passed along partisan lines by the

House of Representatives on April 5, 1995,1 provides
both (a) a 50-percent exclusion for realizations by noncorporate taxpayers of gains from capital assets (other
than from collectibles) held for at least one year and
(b) ind exi ng for inflation of the basis of capital assets
acquired by noncorporate taxpayers on or after January
I, 1995, and held for three or more years. H.R. Rep.
104-84, the accompanying House Ways and Means
Committee Report, provides unusually detailed
"Reasons for Change" 2 in support of these provisions.
Additionally, various congressional committees held
extensive hearings on the CWATRA capital gains proposa ls during the winter of 1995. This article examines
those reasons in the order set forth in the report, as
amplified by the contentions of capital gains cuts
proponents and opponents in the recent hearings and
the House floor debate, concluding that most are either
wrong or better answered through other techniques not
on the table. A principal underlying thesis of this article
is that the proposed 50-percent exclusion of capital
gain would produce inequitable results because the 50
percent or more of annual capital gains realizations
enjoyed by the top 1 percent of families are on the
average themselves more than 50 percent real or economic gains. 3 Thus, a 50-percent exclusion is too
generous. Such exclusion would lower the effective
rate of federal taxation on realized income of families
in that top 1 percent with capital gains considerably
below that of other high-income families without capital gains down to the effective rates of moderate in-

'See Pianin, "Tax Cut Bill Passed by House 246-188; $189
Billion Measures Caps lOO-Day Dash," Washington Post A-I
(Thursday April 6, 1995) (11 Republicans voted no (5 percent);
27 Democrats (10 percent), mostly Southern conservatives,
voted yes).
' H .R. Rep . No . 104, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-6, 38 (1995).
This article discusses only the generic 50-percent exclusion
of gain and indexing for inflation of the basis of capital
asse ts disposed of by noncorporate taxpayers provisions of
CWATRA ; the other capital gains proposals were scarcely
discussed in the hearings or House floor debate, which is
probably a strong indicator of their ultimate legislative
viabi lity.
)The top 1 percent of returns (by adjusted gross income)
reported more than 50 percent of the realized capital gains
in the early 1980s as in earlier decades (except for the mid19705). Congressional Budget Office, How Capital Gains Tax
Rates Affect Revenues: The Historical Evidence 30-1 (March
1988); see 141 Cong o Rec. H 4208 (House April 5, 1995 Daily
Ed.) (Remarks of former chair Sam Gibbons, D-Fla.) . Betw ee n 50 p e rcent and two -thirds of the capital gains
repo rted by taxpayers with over $200,000 in adjusted gross
income were real or economic in the 1970s and early 1980s
with the percentage of real gains climbing with income.
Treas. Dep'I, Report to Congress on tile Capital Gains Tax Reductions of 1978 10, 11,47 (September 1985) (Tax Reductions of
1978); Congressional Budget Office, Indexing Capital Gains
25 Table 5 (A ugust 1990).
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come families,4 thus violating principles of both
horizontal and vertical equity, i.e., taxpayers with like
amounts of income should be taxed equally and the
rate of taxation should increase with ability to pay.
Conversely, the capital gains reported by the bottom
90 percent of families (below $100,000) on the average
are all inflationary gains,S so that a 50-percent exclusion is not generous enough for them. The proposed
inflation adjustment, while avoiding these inequities,
would tend to block realizations by high-income
families 6 more than current law, thus reducing
4Th is was the pattern in the 1960s and 1970s when the
effective rate for the top 1 percent was around 35 percent
despite a top rate of 91 percent gradually reduced to 70 percent, with high-income taxpayers with capital gains being 10
percentage points or so below this average effective rate and
high-income taxpayers without capital gains being 20 percentage points or so above it. House Ways and Means Majority
Staff, Tax Progressivily and Income Distribution, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (House Ways and Means Comm. Prnt 1990); United
States Treasury Department, Tax Reform Studies and Proposals
(Parts 1 and 2), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81-86 and 142-45, respectively (Comm. Prnt 1969); 110 CongoRec. (Part 2) 1438 (Senate
January 30, 1964) (Remarks of Floor Manager Senator Long,
D-La.); Hearings on the Subject afTax Reform (Tax Reform, 1969)
before the House Ways & Means Comm. (Part 4), 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1592, 1598-99 (1969) (Statement of Ass't Sec'ty Stanley
Surrey). The reduction of the top ordinary income and capital
gains rates to 50 percent and 20 percent in 1981, coupled with
the accelerated capitaJ recovery rules, and thus tax shelters,
resulted in an effective rate at the top of 24.9 percent. Tax
Progressivily and Income Distribution, supra at 29; Congressional
Budget Office, The Cllanging Distribution of Federal Taxes: 1975199047 (1987). By 1990 the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repeal of
the capital gains preference and limitations on passive losses
(tax shelters), together with the various revenue raising provisions of the budget acts, had brought the top effective rate
back up to 27 percent. Progressivity and Income Distribution,
supra at 2-4, 12-13; Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Tax
Policy and the Macroeconomy: Stabilization, Growth and DistributiOIl, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 29-30, 55 (House Ways & Means
Comm. Prnt 1991) Thus, the federal income tax system
remained somewhat progressive, but less than in prior
decades. Tax Policy and the Macroeconomy, supra at 67-68. The
new top ordinary income "rates" of 36 and 39.6 percent
brought the effective rate of the top 1 percent up to 33 percent
(or about 90 percent of the historic top effective rate). Ways
and Means Democrats, Highlights Republican Tax Package
(March 9, 1995), 95 TNT 50-52 (March 14, 1995). The agenda
of some of the supporters of CWATRA is to eliminate twothirds of the 1993 increase in taxes at the top. 141 Congo Rec.
H 4219 (House AprilS, 1995) (Remarks of Rep. Jim McCrery,
R-La.) ("If two years ago you were against the tax increase,
why would you not be now for giving back to the people about
two-thirds of that tax increase?").
5Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Treatmwt of Capital
Gains and Losses 26 (JCS-7-89 March 11, 1989); CBO, Indexing
Capital Gains, supra note 3 at 26.
6The Joint Committee Staff assumed as to an earlier indexing proposal that high-income taxpayers would tend to hold
on longer to capital assets appreciating more rapidly than the
rate of inflation until more of their real gains were swallowed
by inflation and sell capital assets that failed to exceed the
rate of inflation. David Cloud and John Cranford, "Liberal
Democrats Prevail, Corporate Rate Cut Goes," 50 Congo Q.
Weekly Rep. 391, 393 (February 22, 1992). Such blocking tendency would be increased by a three-year holding period .
TAX NOTES, May 8,1995
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revenues. Combining indexing and a 50-percent exclusion as CWATRA does would be inequitable because
lower- and moderate-income capital gains realizers
would s till have uncompensated real losses on the
average and obtain no benefit from the 50-percent exclusion, while higher-income realizers on the average
would have real gains that would benefit from the
50-percent exclusion. The real danger in indexing is
that it has little or no constituency among the traditional interest groups supporting capital gains preferences 7 (because they either have little or no basis or do
much better than inflation8 ). Therefore, if enacted
a lone, indexing would probably prove to be a Trojan
Horse, with political pressure building for its replacement with a 50-percent generic capital gains exclusion,
which after a few years could be done with no revenue
loss. There a re many solutions that avoid most or all
of the above problems but none have sufficient political
s upport for enactment in the current cIimate.9 Consequen tly, the current 28-percent ceiling on individual

7The hearings and floor debate of the past two decades
revea ls that the capita l gai ns proponents explicitly championed timberlot owners; small-business owners and venture
cap italists; farm e rs as to livestock and farmland;
homeowners; and on occasion small investors in the stock
market, roughly in that order. See note 24 infra.
~Timber, small busi ness, and venture capital interests are
on record as preferring a 50-percent exclusion to indexing.
Hearillgs onlhe Impact of Tax Simplification on the U.S. Economy
before Ihe SlIbco mm . on Economic Stabilization of the HOllse
(o/1/ m. on Banking and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 963,
1004, and 1011 (1985) (Impact of Tax Simplification Hearing)
(Statements of Ass't Sec'ty Charles McLure and of Donald
Ackerman, representing National Venture Capital Association, respectively) (small business and venture capital interests preference of a 50-percent exclusion over indexing was
one of th e sta ted reasons for the Reagan administration abandoning its indexing of capital assets proposal); Hearings on
Impact, Effectiveness, and Fairn ess of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
before th e HOll se Ways and Mean s Comm ., 101st Congo2d Sess.
299 (1990) (Attachment by Rep . Ron Wyden, D-Ore.) (woodland owners would not benefit as much from indexing) (1990
HOllse Hearings on Fairness ); accord, Unofficial Transcript of
Way s arId Means Hearing on Repllblican Contract, January 25,
1995 (Statement of William Siegel, president of the Society of
American Foresters), 95 TNT 20-36 (January 31,1995). HighIncome families selling public stock also do better than inflation. See note 3 slIpra .
YThe simpl es t half mea sure would be a 30-percent exclusion of generic capita l gains for noncorporate taxpayers.
It would have no effect beyond the curren t law at the top 1
percent where the 28-percent rate is the practical equivalent
of a 30-percent exclusion and provide a benefit at the 31-,28-,
and 15- percent brackets, where little or no benefit is provided
by the 28-percent rate . I have shown elsewhere how a
"prog ressive" capital gains formula with a 28-percent rate for
the lop 1 percent and a O-percent rate for the bottom 95
percent of families mimics exclusion of the average inflation
gain at those brackets without the additional blocking of
indexing. John Lee, "President Clinton's Capital Gain Proposals," Tax Noles, June 7, 1993, p. 1399 at 1404-1405. A
similar, rougher effect could be obtained by excluding the
first, say, $3,500 of annual ca pital gains, perhaps phased out
across the 31-percent bracket (around $89,000 to $140,000
joint return taxable income). ld .
TAX NOTES, May 8, 1995

capital gains should be maintained and no further preference given at the current time.
Myth No: 1_ A Capital Gains Tax Cut Will
Increase the Saving Rate of American Households
H.R. Rep. No. 84 points out that net personal savings
in the United States averaged 4 .8 percent of gross
domestic product (GOP) in the 1980s, below the rate of
our major trading partners, and further dropped to 3.5
percent of GOP in 1992.10 House Ways and Means Chair
Bill Archer, R-Texas, believes that 95 percent or more
of the net proceeds of capital gains sales are reinvested
in capital assets. 11 Under this view, reducing capital
gains taxes that are vacuumed up by Treasury and
redistributed in consumption must increase the
savings rate. 12 According to the report, many
economists testified that a reduction in capital gains
taxation by increasing the rate of return on savings
would increase savings. 13 The actual theoretical and
empirical economic literature conflicts as to whether
an increase in rate of return increases savings. 14 As Dr.
Barry Bosworth, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, put it at the January 11, 1995, Ways and Means
Hearing on the Contract: "We [economists] don't agree
on a damn thing about how to stimulate private
savings and what will work and what won't work."
Indeed, Chair Archer's premise of 95-percent reinvestment was wrong in the real world of the leveraged
buyouts in the 1980s, when over half of the proceeds
were spent on consumption items. 15 Most significantly,
this "cut the capital gains rate-increase private
savings" experiment has been tried before and failed.
The 1978 and 1981 capital gains cuts did not increase
the individual savings rate despite claims at the time
that they would. Indeed, household savings fell in the
period following such cutS.16 From this, one could con-

IOH.R. Rep. No 84, supra note 2 at 35. See generally Toder,
"Comments on Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform," Tax
Notes, Mar. 27, 1995, p. 2003 at 2008 (Treasury Written Statement to Senate Budget Committee).
llWays and Means Hearing on the Republican Contract,
January 25, 1995 (Statement of Chair Bill Archer, R-Texas).
12Id. (Colloquy between Chair Bill Archer, R-Texas, and Dr.
Jane Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy Congressional Research Service.)
llH.R. Rep . No. 84, supra note 2, at 35. Searching the unofficial transcripts for "saving" reveals a picture more consistent with the following text. Those economists who did
think a capital gains cut would increase savings appeared to
base their conclusion mostly on the premise that if less taxes
were collected on capital gains realizations more money
would be available to save.
14Joint Committee on Taxation, Description and Analysis of
S. 612 (Savings and Investment Incentive Act of 1991), 37
(JCS-5-91 May 15, 1991) ("JCT, Savings and Investment"); Tax
Policy and the Macroeconomy, supra note 4 at 48-9; George
Zodrow, "Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation:
Realizations, Revenues, Efficiency and Equity," 48 Tax L. Rev.
419,469-78 (1993).
ISCalvin Johnson, "The Consumption of Capital Gains,"
Tax Notes, May 18, 1992, p . 957 at 962.
16Toder, supra note 10 at 2008.
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c1ude that the savings incentives in the Contract will
not lift the private savings rate. 17 Rather, given that the
decline in savings occurred as to Americans now 55 or
older,ls other causes appear to have been at work. For
example, the decline may be attributable to an increase
in the availability of insurance and Social Security and
Medicare benefits, reducing the necessity for private
savings. 19 The most direct way to increase private
sav ings is likely to be to reduce the federal budget
d e ficit. 20
Myth No.2: A Capital Gains Tax Cut Will
Encourage Risk Taking by Individuals Pursuing
New Businesses Exploiting New Technologies

H.R. Rep. No. 84 reasons that risk taking is stifled
if taxation of any resulting gain is high and the ability
to claim losses is limited .21 Proponents of the capital
gains cuts in the Contract steadfastly maintained in the
1995 hearings that a generic capital gains cut (some
added indexing) is necessary either to unlock frozen
capital asse ts for investment in starting up or expanding young businesses or to reward the entrepreneur
and investors for the greater risk in new ventures. 22
The opposing view is that entrepreneurs (who together
with family and friends are the primary source of cap-

"Sylvia Nasar, "Older Americans Cited in Studies of National Sav ings Slump," New York Times A-I, col. 1 (Tuesday
February 21, 1995).
" Congressional Budget Office, Baby Boomers in Retirement
30 (September 1993) (Boomers); Nasar, supra note 17.
" Toder, supra note 10 at 2008; JCT, Savings and Investment,
supra note 14 at 59; Nasar, supra note 17. Boomers, supra note
18, at 30, reasons that in addition to ant icipating relatively
generous transfers from public and private pensions, older
Americans may have seen capital gains on housing as a substitute for financial wealth during the housing boom of the
1970s w hen borrowing costs (particularly from earlier mortgages) were low. Additionally, they could foresee indexed
Socia l Security benefits so that fear of inflation was lessened
and Medicare as lessening the burden of medical costs. ld .
2°Toder, supra note 10, at 2008.
"H.R. Rep . No. 84, supra note 2, at 35. A generic exclusion
is poorly targeted to any problems with risk taking. See Joint
Committee on Taxation, Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and
Losses 18 (JCS4-95 February 13, 1995) ("Capital Gains and
Losses 1995"); see also James Porteba, "Capital Gains Policy
Towards Entrepreneurship," 42 Nat'l Tax J. 375, 383 (1989)
(distinguish by enterprise s ize or due to high failure rate, 62
percent in six years, provide more substantial loss provisions
rather than a preference on gain realization).
" Unofficial Transcript of Ways and Means Hearing on Republican Contract, January 24, 1995 (Statement of Mark Bloomfield, preSident, American Council for Capital Formation), 95
TNT 20-35 (January 31, 1995); id. (Statements of Paul Huard,
representing National Association of Manufacturers; William
Sinclaire, representing U.s. Chamber of Commerce; and
Joseph Lane, representing National Association of Enrolled
Agents); Ullofficial Transcript of HOI/ se Small Business Hearing
Oil Capital Gains, January 26, 1995 (Statement of Sydney HoffHay, representing Sma ll Business Survival Committee), 95
TNT 20-38 (January 31, 1995).
812

ital for new ventures 23 ) are motivated by the rewards
of running their own business and not the capital gains
tax rate on selling out. As Rep. Fortney Pete Stark,
D-Calif., asserted at the January 25, 1995, Ways and
Means Hearing on the Contract, "entrepreneurs are
born, not made." Thus, "stifling" appears a myth, at
least with a top capital gains rate of 28 percent, a top
ordinary rate of 39.6 percent, and an existing preference of 50 percent for stock in certain small businesses
under section 1202, which CWATRA would repeal. For
most entrepreneurs, a capital gains preference appears
to be a subsidy rewarding them for what they would
have done anyway rather than an incentive to do what
they otherwise would not have done.

For most entrepreneurs~ a capital
gains preference appears to be a
subsidy rewarding them for what they
would have done anyway rather than
an incentive to do what they otherwise
would not have done.
The real myth is that the capital gains preference
"essentially" benefits the small-business folks, farmers,
and home owners, in whose interest congressional capital gains cuts proponents usually claim the need for
the additional capital gains preferences. 24 Rep . Ron

13Lee, supra note 9, at 1415; Ways and Means Hearing January
24,1995 (Statement of Mark Bloomfield); id. (Statement of Rep.
Phll English, R-Pa.); Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 3, at viii,
]44-46; Hearings on Economic Growth and the President's Budget
Proposals before the Senate Finance Committee (Part 1), 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 56, 60 (1992) (Statement of Robert Gilbertson,
representing American Electronics Association); accord, id. at
61 (Statement of John J. Motley, representing National Federation of Independent Business); 1990 House Hearings on Fairness,
supra note 8, at 118 (Statement of Professor Alan Auerbach);
id. at 130 (Statement of Dr. Henry Aaron, director of Economic
Studies at the Brookings Institute); Joint Committee on Taxation, Proposals and Issues Relating to Taxation of Capital Gains
and Losses, 33 (JC5-1O-90 March 23, 1990); Capital Gains and
Losses 1995, supra note 21, at 19.
2'The 1989 floor debate on the capital gains cut sponsored
by Rep. Ed Jenkins, D-Ga. and Rep. Bill Archer, R-Texas, most
clearly identified the capital gains special interests of timber,
small business and high tech ventures, farmers, (farmland
and recurring sales of livestock), and occasionally residences.
135 Congo Rec. at H 6281 (House September 28, 1989 Daily
Ed.) (Remarks of Rep. Beryl Anthony, D-Ark.) (beneficiaries
of capital gains cut are homeowners, farmers, small businessman, small investor nest egg); id. at H 6284-85 (Remarks
of Rep. Tom Campbell, R-Ca1.) ("Northern California and the
Silicon Valley is composed of entrepreneurs, risk-takers who
are willing to put their effort and their money on the line";
capital gains is only the start to reward competitiveness); id.
at H 6289 (Remarks of Rep. Steve Gunderson, R-Wis.) (small
business and farm; individuals source of own capital in small
businesses, they build up equity 20-30 years for retirement;
also farmers sell funder section 1231) 20 head of breeding
stock a year); id. at H 6290 (Remarks of Rep. Bill Frenzel,
(Footnote 24 continued on next page.)
TAX NOTES, May 8,1995
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Wyden O-Ore., in the January 25, 1995, Ways and
Means Hearings on the Contract, epitomized the
myth: "There is this perception in America that the
capi tal gains issue will help, you know, somebody
who is clipping coupons and working out of a highrise building in Manhattan and will not, you know,
essentially be of benefit to the kind of people that
you're talking about [i.e.,] Americans who are middle income, they're retired, they're small businesses,
they're entrepreneurs trying to start a biotech company who would benefit from this."25 Some congressional supporters of the current capital gains proposals, such as Rep. Wyden, might actually believe
that the primary beneficiaries of the cuts are these
interests . They are deluded. Small-business people
and farmers together probably account for 5 to 10
percent of annual capital gains realizations at best;26

R-Minn .) (small high-risk start-up); id. at H 6296 (Remarks
of Rep . Ron Wyden, D-Ore.) (small business/jobs); id. at H
6280 (House September 28, 1989 Daily Ed .) (Remarks of Rep.
Lindsay Thomas, D-Ga.) ("The people I have heard from have
not been in investments, or wealthy people, but the landowners who worked the forest land in my district. ") See also
id . at H 6278 (Remarks of Rep . Charles Ra ngel, D-N.Y.) ("timber becomes the iss ue rathe r than the social needs of our
co untr y.") See 45 CO llg . Q. Almallac 115 (1989); Charles
Kra utha mmer, "Stea ling from the Future," Washington Post
A-31, col. 1 (Thursday September 28, 1989); Lee, supra note 9
at 1404. The 1995 debate identified fewer special interests.
Trallscrip t of Senate Hearing on Capital Gains, February 15,
1995, (Sta te ment of Senator Charles Grassley, R-Iowa) ("It
seems like the mail I get on the subject of capital gains comes
mostly from farmers or small business people."), 95 TNT
36-42 (February 23, 1995); accord, Hearings on the President's
1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals before the House Ways
& Mean s Com mittee (Part 5), 95th Congo 2d Sess. 2803 (1978)
(Statemen t of Rep . Ed Jenkins, D-Ga .) (small businesses want
capita l gains); H.R. Rep. No. 1445, 95th Congo 2d Sess. 119
(1978).
2sRep . Harold Volkmer, D-Mo., espoused just before the
House flo or debate on CWATRA the opposite, more accurate
view: "capital gains cuts for big investors who own shopping
centers, who own stocks and bonds on Wall Street." 141 Congo
Rec. H 41 82 (House AprilS, 1995 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Rep.
Harold Vo lkmer, D-Mo .).
2bSa les of farm land and fa rm land together with unharvested crops and livestock cons tituted 0.9 percent of all net
capi ta l gai ns in 1973 and 0.6 percent in 1977. Tax Reductiolls
of 1978, supra no te 3, at 16-19. Research disclosed no direct
data as to capital gains realizations attributable to equities in
close corporations, but all available data points to a 10:1 ratio
of va lue of public stock to close stock. Prior to the 1976 estate
and gift tax reform, 70 pe rcent of estate assets were public
stock and only 6 percent of the estimated tax cost of the
Sena te esta te and gift tax prov ision (which did not include
ca rryover basis) was attributable to closely held stock and
farms . See 122 Congo Rec. (Part 20) 25954-55 (Senate August
5, 1976) (Remarks of Senator George Hathaway, D-Me., and
Senator Edward Kennedy, D-Mass. ); Public Hearings and Panel
Discussions on Federal Estate and Gift Taxes before the House
Way s and Meall s Committ ee (Part 1), 94th Congo 2d Sess. 355
(1976) (Statement of Robert Brandon, public interest group)
(untraded closely held corporation stock totaled not more
than $1.9 billion; marketable securities, $14 billion) . Equities
(Footnote 26 continued in next column.)
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venture capital, around 1 percent;27 and the overwhelming number of sales of personal residences are
not taxed due to rollovers, the $125,000 a~e 55 exclusion, and the step-up in basis at death,2 In good
stock market years 50 percent of the realizations are
equity, overwhelmingly public stock, and the bulk of
the rest of the realizations are improved real estate. 29
in small businesses also appeared more recently to be less
than 15 percent by value of the equities in all corporations.
In 1988, the 10,400 largest and mostly public corporations
(out of less than four million corporations in all including S
corporations) held 84 percent of the corporate assets by adjusted basis (so that self-created goodwill would not be
counted). Also public stock trades much more frequently
than stock in a close corporation. Lee, supra note 9, at 1416.
The Small Business Administration estimates that only 10
percent of business finance resources currently go to small
business. Letter dated April 3, 1995, from Jere W, Glover,
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.s. Small Business Administration to Rep. Zoe Lofgren, D-Cal., reprinted in 141 Congo
Rec. H 4318 (House April 5, 1995 Daily Ed.). Thus annual
realizations of close corporation stock probably do not exceed 10 percent of total stock realizations by amount. Stock
realizations are generally 50 percent of all annual capital
gains realizations, note 29 infra, so realizations of stock in
close corporations probably do not exceed 5 percent of all
capital gains realizations on the average.
21In 1983 venture capital investments amounted to only
0.1 percent of total net worth and less than 1 percent of the
market value of equity of all nonfinancial corporations. Tax
Reductions of 1978, supra note 3 at 139; see Poterba, supra note
21, at 382 (initial public offerings by venture backed firms
averaged 1.1 percent of total capital gains realizations).
2!lTax Reductions of 1978, supra note 3, at 98; 124 Congo Rec,
25471 (House August 10, 1978) (Remarks of Rep , Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill.); accord, Art Pine, "House Unit Votes inflation Factor for Capital Gains," Washington Post A-I, Col. 3
(Wednesday July 26, 1978). The median purchase price of a
new home in 1993 was $126,500, just above the section 121
excluded gain ceiling. Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement
and Tax Reform, Final Report with Reform Proposals and Additional Views of Commissioners (January 30, 1995), 95 TNT 33-43
(February 17, 1995). As much as two-thirds of annual capital
appreciation was not recognized during 1949-88 prior to
death; with adjustments for owner-occupied housing gains
excluded under section 121 and corporate stock held by taxexempts, taxable realizations were about 46 percent of accruals. Jane Gravelle, "Limits to Capital Gains Feedback Effects," Tax Notes, Apr. 22, 1991, p . 363 at 364-365; Mervin King
and Don Fullerton, Taxation of Income from Capital (1984) .
29Prepared Statement of Jane G. Gravelle, Senior Specialist
in Economic Policy Congressional Research Service Before
the Senate Finance Committee February 15, 1995, 95 TNT
32-38 (February 16, 1995) (gains from equities range from
about 20 to 50 percent of annual realizations depending on
the relative performance of the stock market; much of
remainder is gain on real estate); Tax Reductions of 1978, supra
note 3, at ii, iii, viii, 15, 16; Capital Gains and Losses 1995, supra
note 21; Hearings on H.R. 8363 (the Revenue Act of 1963) before
the Senate Finance Committee (Part 1), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 197
(1963) (41 percent of capital gains realizations in 1959 from
corporate stock) (1963 Senate Hearings); Congressional
Budget Office, Effects of Lower Capital Gains Taxes on Economic
Growth, 30 (August 1990) ("In 1984, 46 percent of net capital
gains was on corporate stock, .. ."). During the 1985-89
period, sales of stock, securities, and partnership interests
(Footnote 29 continued on next page.)
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Timber and livestock, other frequently touted capital
gains special interests, make up only a fraction of annu al realizations of capital assets.30
Other capital gains proponents probably realize that
the interests that they champion garner only a small percentage of the benefits (as a reward), but such small business and farm or timber interests, depending on the
region, are both the vocal constituents of that member of
Congress and local opinion leaders who do want the
benefits of a capital gain preference. So they follow the
late Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill's adage that "[a]ll
politics is local"31 and support the preference for their
constituents' small piece of the benefits. Still others really
want the preference for the wealthy realizing the bulk of
capital gains year after year, mostly from public stock and
real estate investments, who are their constituents32 and
are cloaking that interest in the mantle of the small business, farm, and residence. The classic example of this
cloaking came in a 1976 Senate Finance Committee Hearing when Senator Abraham Ribicoff, D-Conn., challenged
the claim of the Merrill Lynch & Co. representative that
capita l gains taxes impacted most severely on small investors; the witness agreed but rejoined, still cloaking,
that the point he was trying to make was that of the
investor in his own company who sells it on retirement. 33
Myth No.3: Lowering Capital Gains Rates Will
Unblock Many Sales Permitting More Money To
Flow to New, More Highly Valued Uses

realizations. The report concludes that such unblocking would permit money to flow to new, more highly
valued uses, thus improving the efficiency of the capital market.34 For more than 50 years, capital gains cut
proponents have claimed that unblocking would permit capital to flow from sales of public stock to new
companies. 35 That case has never been made. Despite
claims of capital gains cuts proponents that the
CWATRA 50-percent generic capital gains cut "would
free up capital for small business and entre~reneurs,
providing the economy with seed com . . . ," 6 realizations from public stock do not flow to new venture
capital or to closely held businesses (unless they are of
public stock held by the entrepreneur herself) .37 As Sen.
Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., father of the section 1202 targeted small-business stock preference slated for repeal
by CWATRA, stated in the aftermath of the House's
passage of CWATRA: "I have never understood what
economic benefit this country derives when somebody
sells General Electric and uses the money and buys
DuPont stock."38 The Small Business Administration
also regards a generic capital gains cut as "rewarding
nonproductive speculation in real estate or the stock
market .... "39 The facts behind this rhetoric are that
most mature corporations raise outside capital these
days through debt and not common stock offerings.4o
14H. R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 2, at 35.
15See H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong
2d Sess. 29 (1942);
Hearings on Revenue Revision 1942 before ti,e House Ways and
Means Comm . (Vols. 1 and 2), 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 262-63 and
1652-55, respectively (1942) (Colloquy between Ass't Sec'ty
Randolph Paul and Rep . Frank Crowther, R-N.Y., and Rep.
Harold Knutson, R-Minn., respectively).
36
141 Congo Rec. H 4211 (House April 5, 1995 Daily Ed .)
(Remarks of Rep. Phil English, R-Pa.)
37See note 23 supra, and accompanying text.
38
14 1 Congo Rec. S 5297 (Senate April 6, 1995 Daily E.)
(Remarks of Sen. Dale Bumpers, D-Ark.); accord Hearings on
Reverflle and Spending Proposals for Fiscal Year 1990 before tile
Sena te Finance Comm. (Part 2), 101 st Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1989)
(Statement of Senator Dale Bumpers, D-Ark.) (why give investors in public stock a tax break for something they arc
already doing without any tax break?) (1989 Senate Hearings);
141 Congo Rec. at H 4209 (House April 5, 1995) (Remarks of
former chair Sam Gibbons, D-Fla.) ("They are just swapping
their equities around between each other.. .. There is no creation of additional capital. It is just a game there. So it is bad
economic justice, it is bad social justice."); Harold Pepperell,
"'Rush' Exposes the Capital Gains Tax Cut Hoax," Tax Notes,
Feb. 20, 1995, p. 1200. These "speculation" criticisms do not
apply to original issue stock. From 1984 through 1990, however, net corporate equity issues were negative (with the bulk
due to debt-financed acquisitions.) . Treas. Dep't, Integration
of Individual and Corporat e Tax Systems- Taxing Bllsiness InCOme Once 8-9 (January 1992).
39SBA letter to Rep. Zoe Lofgrcn, D-Calif., slIpra note 26.
4OBefore 1986, publicly traded corporate debt and common
stock were issued in roughly equal amounts; in 1987 new
corporate debt issues were 10 times new stock issues. Statement of Professor Calvin Johnson, Three Errors in the
"Neutral Cost Recovery System" Proposal, for the House
Ways and Means Committee Hearing on January 24, 1995,
and authorities cited at n. 32 (January 26, 1995),95 TNT 20-39
(January 31, 1995). The same ratio of 10:1 debt to equity new
(Footnote 40 continued on next page.)
ll

The Ways and Means report states that a reduction
in the capita l gains tax should improve the efficiency
of the cap ital markets; all economists agreed that a
capita l gains cut would reduce "lock-in" and increase

compri sed about half of reported capital gains . Michael
Halia ssos & Andrew Lyon, "Progressivity of Capital Gains
Taxation with Optimal Portfolio Selection," paper presented
at University of Michigan Tax Conference on September 11,
1992,92 TNT 190-28 (September 11, 1992).
.wIn 1959, timber and other natural resource capital gains
amounted to 2.1 percent of total long-term capital gain; livestock, 5.7 percent. 1963 Senate Hearings, sllpra note 29, at 197
(Statement of Sec' ty Douglas Dillon). In 1973, net gains from
timber amoun ted to 0.6 percent of net gai ns; gains from livestock and farmland with unharvested crops amounted to 0.4
percent. 1978 Tax Reductions, supra note 3, at 16-7. For 1977 the
comparable figures were 1.3 percent and 0.5 percent. Id. at 18-9.
31T. O'Neill, Man of the HOllse 26 (1987).
12Chair Bill Archer, R-Texas, represents "one of the halfdozen most afflu ent [districts] in Congress" David Rosenbaum, "A Zeal for Tax Cuts Now Has Power, Too," New York
Times A-I, col. 4, at col. 6 (Tuesday, April 4, 1995) ("affluent
taxpayers must receiv e tax breaks becau se they are mainly
the ones who invest money and create jobs for others.");
accord 141 Congo Rec. H 4213 (House April 5,1995 Daily Ed.)
(Remarks of Chair Bill Archer, R-Texas) ("we provide fuel for
the engine that pulls the train of economic grow th by cutting
capital ga ins") . This is the trickle down philosophy. See notes
81 -84 infra and accompanying text.
3J Hearings on H.R. 10612 (Tax Reform Act of 1975) before tile
Senate Finance Comm. (Part 4), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1849-50
(1976) (Colloquy between Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, D-Conn., and
Thomas Chrystie, senior vice prcsident, Merrill Lynch & Co.).
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Not surprisingly, therefore, less than 3 percent of the
action on Wall Street consists of public offerings of new
common stock. 41 Initial public offerings make up onethird to one-half of new common stock offerings,42
most of which probably could qualify under section
1202 as to noncorporate purchasers and thus obtain a
preference under current law. To the extent this is not
so, the remedy is amendment of section 1202, not its
repeal and replacement with a wasteful generic capital
gains preference.43
Myth No.4: Unblocking Sales Will Have the
Short-term and Long-Term Effect of Increasing
Revenues
The Ways and Means Committee report also claims
that this unblocking of sales will have the short- and
long- term effect of increasing revenues. 44 Whether the
proposed preferences would raise revenue is harder to
p redict since thi s is another economic question upon
which economists cannot agree in theory or empirical
studies . The iss ues are microeconomic (increased
rea li za tions throug h unblocking effects) and macroeconomi c (growth in the economy) effects. The Joint
Com mittee Staff estimates that increased realizations
induced by the CWATRA capital gains cuts would
lower the "static" loss in the five-year budget window
by 60 percent. 45 The catch is that the Joint Committee
believes that after an initial surge in realizations (50
percen t of th e baseline during the initial five-year
budget window 46 ) most taxpayers will settle into a permanent level of lower realizations yet higher than
would be expected in the absence of a rate reductionY
But this permanent level of realizations would still lose
revenue over the five-year budget window and

issues holds true today. Monthly Roundup; Some Improvement, In vestm ent Dealer's Digest 30 (March 20,1995) (February
dcb t offerings raised $38.9 billion, down 51 percent from a
YCM ago; new equity issues raised $4.2 billion down from
$8.8 billion a year ago). Initial publiC offerings range from
one-third to one-half of total common stock underwritings.
Anita Raghavan, "Slack Underwriting Activity Takes Its Toll
on Wall Street," Chicago Sun-Times 50 (Tuesday April 4, 1995)
(Accordi ng to Securities Data in the first quarter of 1995
initial public off erings plunged to $3.8 billion, a 54-percent
drop from a year ago, while total common stock underwritings slid 35 percent to $12.3 billion). Thus, only a small fraction of new offerings of debt and stock consist of common
stock of ma ture companies.
"Harold Pepperell, "Should Capital Gains Taxes Be
Raised?" Tax Notes, Jan . 17, 1994, p . 379 at 380.
<2See note 40 supra.
HI wish to thank my colleague Charles Koch for admonishing me to think about a preference for new issues .
"H.R. Rep . No . 84, supra note 2, at 35.
'5Sena te Finance Hearing on Capital Gains, February 15, 1995
(S tatement of Dr. Jane Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic
Policy CRS).
46Joint Committee on Taxa tion, Methodology and Issues in
the Revenue Estimating Process (lCX-2-95 January 23, 1995),95
TNT 15-15 (January 24, 1995) (M ethodology in Revenue EstimatIng

1995).
"Methodology in Reveni/e Es timating 1995, supra note 46.
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beyond. The Joint Committee found that the capital
gains relief in the originally proposed Contract would
have cost $53.9 billion over five years and $170 billion
over 10 years.48 It scored the capital gains proposals as
modified on March 9, 1995, as losing only $31.7 billion
over the first five years,49 with most of the change
attributable to a scaled back corporate capital gains
provision. 50 Treasury put the capital gains costs of
original proposals at $ 60.9 billion and $183.1 billion,
respectively. 51 Treasury scored CWATRA's capital
gains provisions considerably lower, however, losing
only $] 1 billion over the five-year bUdyet window and
$91 billion over the lO-year window. s Here too there
was an experiment, the 1978 and 1981 capital gains tax
cuts. Treasury and the Joint Committee both found
that, over the long haul, these capital gains cuts lost
revenue under a "timed series" analysis .53

48Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, Analysis of Estimated Effects on Fiscal Year Budget Receipts of the Revenue
Provisions in the "Contract with America" (H.R. 6, H.R. 8,
H.R . 9, H.R. 11) (]CX-4-94) (February 6, 1995), 95 TNT 26-12
(February 8, 1995). For 1995-2000 the estimated losses were
$21.7 billion for the 50-percent individual capital gains
deduction, $15.1 billion for the corporate preference, $11.2
billion for indexing, and $700 million for the capital loss
deduction as to residences with an offset of $5.2 billion when
all of the capital gains provisions are estimated together as
an entire package. For 2001-05 the breakdown was $73.4 billion for the 50-percent individual capital gains deduction,
$30.3 billion for the corporate preference, $45.2 billion for
indexing, and $1.6 billion for the capital loss deduction as to
residences with an offset of $19.8 billion when all of the
capital gains provisions are estimated together as an entire
package.
4'Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of
the Provisions Relating to H.R. 1215, The "Contract With America
Tax Relief Tax Act of1995" (]CX-11-95 March 14,1995),95 TNT
51-8 (March 15, 1995).
50Barbara Kirchheimer, "House Tax Package Includes New
Mix of Corporate Tax Relief," 95 TNT 48-1 (March 10, 1995).
5'Prepared Statement of Ass't Sec'ty Leslie Samuels for
House Ways and Means Committee Hearing, January 11,
1995, 95 TNT 7-39 Oanuary 11, 1995).
52Treasury Department, Estimated Effects on Receipts "Contract With America Tax Relief Act of 1995 " Ways and Mean s
Chairman's Mark (March 13, 1995), 95 TNT 51-10 (March 15,

1995) (CWATRA Effects on Receipts).
SJ Hearings on Tax lrlcentives for IncreaSing Savings arid Investmmts before the Senate Finance Comm., 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 67 (1990) (Statement of Joint Committee Chief of Staff
Ron Pearlman) (1990 Senate Tax Incentives Hearing); Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 3, at ix, 179, 186. Treasury's cross-section analysis showed revenue gains from the cuts, so the
evidence was mixed and the Treasury economists did not feel
that there was justification for a firm conclusion that lowering the capital gains rate would raise revenue. Andrew
Hoerner, "Treasury's Capital Gains Estimates: Mr. Economist
Goes to Washington," Tax Notes, July 10, 1989, p. 141 at 142.
Treasury later redid its time-series studies, concluding that
it did not as strongly support the conclusion that the 1978
and 1981 capital gains cuts lost revenue over time. Michael
Darby, Robert Gillingham, and John Greenlees, "The Direct
Revenue Effects of Capital Gains Taxation: A Reconsideration
of the Time-Series Evidence," Treasury Dep't, 2 Bulletin Oune
(Footnote 53 continued on next page.)
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The big debate is over the macroeconomic or "feedback" effects. Neither Treasury nor the Joint Committee
on Taxation takes such effects into account in estimating future revenue gains and losses, in part because
there is wide disagreement among economists as to
such effects.54 The Treasury study of the 1978 and 1981
capi tal gains cuts did not take such macroeconomic
effects into account.55 It is very difficult to separate the
effects of such tax cuts from other forces a t work in the
economy at that time. For instance, the increased capital gains realizations during 1978-1985 coincided with
s tock and real es tate booms. 56 Moreover, the Joint Committee on Taxation believes that if the CWATRA capital
gains cut produces a growth in productivity, "it would
occur slow ly at first, with most of the effects outside
the five-year budget window."57 While any changes in
entrepreneurship would more likely occur within such
budget window, "(sJuch activity had been a very small
factor in p revious market responses to changes in the
taxation of income from capital."58
Both capital gains proponents and opponents of the
CWATRA capital gains cuts come to this issue with a
history. The opponents remember that the Reagan ad1988), reprinted in The Capital Gains Controversy: A Tax Analysts Reader 137 (J. Andrew Hoerner, ed. 1992 edition). The
cross-section a na lys is looks at a large group of taxpayers
horizontally across a single year, whereas the time-series
looks vertically through a period of time at aggrega te taxpayer data . Congressional Budget Office, How Capital Gains
Tax Rates Affect Revenues: The Historical Evidence 6 (March
1988) (cross-sec tion analysis has many more observations,
i.e., returns, but does not separate tax rate changes from other
factors and does not separate permanent and transitory effects of ra te changes).
5< Unofficial Transcript of Ways and Means Hearing vn the
Republican Co ntract, January 10, 1995 (Statement of Ass't
Sec'ty Leslie Samuels), 95 TNT 12-76 (January 19, 1995);
Methodology in Revenue Estima ting 1995, supra note 46.
"Tax Reductions of 1978, supra note 3, at vii.

~ During the 1980s both public stock and real estate values
increased greatly during the speculative boom. Anne Fisher,
"The New Debate Over the Very Rich," Fortune 42, 44 (June
29, 1992); Sylvia Nasar, "Even Among the Well-Off, the
Richest Get Richer," New York Times 0-1, col. 2, at 0-24, col. 3
(Thursday, March 5, 1992); 1989 Senate Hearings, supra note 38,
at 30 (Statement of Chief of Staff Ron Pearlman); Senate Hearings on Capital Gains February 15, 1995 (Statement of Dr.
Henry Aaron) (one of the biggest bull markets and a real estate
boom of very considerable proportions); Ways and Means Hearing on the Republican Contract, January 24, 1995 (Statement of
Dr. Allen Sinai) (effect of stock market boom on realizatiOns).
Professor Zodrow pOints also to dramatic reduction in
brokerage fees, increased importance of mutual funds with
faster turnover of portfolios, explOSion of LBOs, and introduction of capital gains reporting requirements resulting in increased compliance. George Zodrow, "Economic Analyses of
Capital Gains Taxation: Realizations, Rev enues, Efficiency and
Equity," 48 Tax L. Rev. 419,448 (1993).
57 Methodology in Revenue Estimating 1995, supra note 46.
said. Unofficial Transcript of Ways and Means Hearing on the
Rep ublican Contrac', January 11, 1995 (Statement of Dr.
Michael Boskin) (believes capi tal gains cut will increase
su pply of entrepreneurs but "it is the thing economists have
the most difficulty quantifying."), 95 TNT 13-69 (January 20,
1995).
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ministration sold the 1981 tax cuts (including cutting
the maximum individual capital gains rate from 28 to
20 percent, very close to the CWATRA rate cut) on
macroeconomic assumptions as to increased savings
and productivity that, together with not-tied-down
spending cuts, would lead to balancing the budget.59
The current deficit is the result of those tax cuts, increases in defense spending, and the failure to make
deep cuts in other spending. The proponents, on the
other hand, remember that the problem of scoring a
capital gains cut as a revenue loser played a major role
in stymieing President George Bush's proposed capital
gains cut in 1990, and some members of Congress see
a reprise currently.60 Then Treasury's estimates showed
a revenue gain while the Joint Committee's showed a
revenue loss of almost the same amount. 61 Some apYJWays and Means Hearing January 24, 1995 (Statement of
Rep. Robert Matsui, O-Calif.); Transcript of the Ways and Means
Hearing on the Republican Contract, January 5, 1995 (Statement
of Rep. Sam Gibbons, D-Fla.) ("1 will not go down the road
again, having made the mistake once, of voting for tax reductions and just taking an empty promise that we're going to
get the spending cuts."); Barbara Kirchheimer, "Finance
Majority Prefers Deficit Reduction to Tax Cuts," 95 TNT 55-1
(March 21, 1995) (same simile by Senator Bob Packwood, ROre.); 141 Congo Rec. H 4214 (House April 5, 1995) (Remarks
of Rep. Sam Gibbons, D-Fla.) ("It is deja vu aU over again. The
same rhetoric, the same people."); id. (Remarks of Rep. Sander
Levin, D-Mich.). President Ronald Reagan's first budget message to Congress contained "overoptimistic" macroeconomic
offsets to proposed tax cuts projecting a $342 bil1ion increase
in federal receipts over 1981-86. Joint Committee on Taxation
Staff, Explanation of Methodology Used to Estimate Proposals Affecting the Taxation of Income from Capital Gains, 7 n.10 OCS-1290 March 27, 1990) (Methodology 1990). Instead, total receipts
rose just $170 biJIion and only after substantial revenue increases in 1982 and 1984. ld. See also Hearings on Tax Aspects of
the President's Economic Program before the House Committee on
Ways & Means (Part 1), 97th Con g., 1st Sess. 14, 17, 42 (1981)
(Statement of Sec'ty Don Regan); id. 56-7,61, 70 (Statement of
Office of Managemen t and Budget Director David Stockman)
(spending control plan is essential and indispensable anchor;
"combination of incentive-minded tax rate reductions and
firm budget control is expected to lead to a balanced budget
by 1984"); id. at 115, 118 (Statement of chairman of President's
Council of Economic Advisers Murray Weidenbaum); 127
Congo Rec. (Part 12) 15768 (Senate July 15, 1981) (Remarks of
Chair Bob Dole, R-Kan.); id. (Part 14) at 18051 (House July 29,
1981) (Remarks of Rep. Kent Hance, D-Texas); id. at 18079
(House July 29, 1981) (Remarks of Rep. Clarence Brown, ROhio); id. (Part 13) at 17834 (Senate July 28, 1981) (Remarks of
Senator William Roth, R-Del.); id. at 17975 (Senate July 29,
1981) (Remarks of Senator Steve Symms, R-Idaho) ("The tax
reductions will be more than paid for by spending reductions,
additional revenues from faster economic growth, and higher
levels of private saving and investment.").
60Prepared Opening Statement of Chairman John Kasich,
R-Ohio, Joint House and Senate Budget Committee Hearing
on "CongreSSional Budget Cost Estimating" January 10,1995,
eJectronicaJly reproduced 95 TNT 7-36 Oanuary 10, 1995).
61Treasury scored a 30-percent exclusion against a 28-percent rate (or 19.6-percent maximum individual rate) as gaining $12.5 billion over five-year window; Joint Committee,
losing $11.4 billion). Methodology 1990, supra note 59, at 2. The
administration believed that reducing the tax rate on capital
(Footnote 61 continued on next page.)
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parently mi s reme mber Treas ury as using macroeconom ic assumptions and the Joint Committee as
u si n g s tatic ass umptions .62 Neither used macroeco nomic ass umptions; both used microeconomic ass umptions of induced realiza tions.63
Clearly, m ore realizations and hence more revenue
would result from taxa tion at d ea th of unrealized apprecia tion (ma n y more realizations would occur prior
to deat h) or a nnual accrual of unrealized appreciation
in public stock .64 Those who support additional capital
gains preferences would give them up rather than be
faced with income taxation at death - that was President Jo hn F. Kennedy's proposed package in 1963,
which was re jected by capital gains cut proponents.65
Their opposition to annual accrual would be even more
intense unless perhaps coupled with passthrough corporate sha reholder integration, which would be the
ideal a n s wer to a h ost of current law policy problems.

gains would permanently increase realizations of gains by
enough to offset the rev enue loss from the lower rate. JCT
judged that afte r an initial s urge, the increase in realizations
wo uld offset much but not all of the rate reduction. Congressional Budget Office, Budget Es timates: Current Practices and
Alternati ve Approaches (J an u ary 12, 1995), 95 TNT 7- 16
(Janua ry 11, 1995) ("CBO, Budget Estimates"). Also a big part
of Treasury's estima tes of the revenue gains came from complete re ap tu re of improved real esta te depreciation and inclusion of the 3D-percent exclusion as an alternative minimum tax item. 1990 Se /l ale Tax In centives Hea ring, supra note
53 a t 64-5 (Statemen t of Ron Pearlman) .
62Cha ir Bill Archer, R-Texas, is reported to have thought
that the Joint Committee on Taxation used a static methodology while Treasury used a dynamic methodology. Barbara
Kirc hh e imer, " Archer Wants Mini -reconciliation for
Contract's Taxes, Spending," 95 TNT 3-2 (January 5, 1995).
6JWays and Means Hea ring January 10, 1995 (Statement of
Ass' t Sec' ty Leslie Samuels); Methodology in Revenue Estimating 1995, sllpra note 54.
MSenate Hearing on Capital Gains February 15, 1995 (Statements of Dr. Henry Aaron a nd Dr. Ja ne Gravelle).
6SThe benefit of the Democratic quid (increased capital
gain s preference) was outweighed by the burden of the Republican quo (taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at
death which would have more than paid for the capital gains
cuts throu gh increased realizations, President's 1963 Tax
Message 26, rep rinted in Hearings before the House Committee
on Ways & Meaus (Part 3), 88th Congo 1st Sess. (1963». 1963
Senate Hearing s, supra note 29, at 285 (Colloquy between
Senator Pau l Do uglas, 0 -111., and Secretary of the Treasury
Douglas Dillon); 1963 HOl/ se Hearings (Part 3), sllpra at id. at
1327 (S tate ment of Henry Bi son, Na tional Association of
Retail Grocers); 1344 (Statement o f Donald Alexander, Associa ti o n of Ins titutional Distributors) (heaviest burde n
would fall on small - and medium-s ized bus inesses); id. a t
1364 (Statement of Samuel Foosaner, New Jersey Manufacturers' Association) (burden on small business particularly
from "goodwill" based upon capitalized earnings); id. at 1419
(Statement of Keith Funston, representing the New York
Stock Exchange); id . at 1538, 1540-42 (Statement of Albe rt
Mitchell and Stephen Hart, Esq., National Livestock Tax
Committee); id. (Part 5), at 2529-91 (Statement of Rep . Joseph
Montoya, D-N.M.); see also 1963 Senate Hearings, supra at 496
(Statement of Joel Barlow, representing the Chamber of Commerce of the United States).
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Myth No.5: Many Americans Realizing Capital
Gains Are Middle-Income Taxpayers Pushed Into
Top Brackets by a Once-in-a-Lifetime Sale
Treasury scored 76.3 percent of the benefits of the
individual CWATRAcapital gains exclusion and indexing as going to taxpayers with "family economic income" of $100,000 and above. 66 Treas ury' s distribution
tables showed the top 1 percent of families (700,000
families, beginning at $349,438) as receiving 45.9 percent of such tax benefits; the top 5 percent (2,300,000
families beginning at $145,412), 66.5 percent of such
benefits; and the top 10 percent (3,500,000 families
beginning at $108,704), 73.9 percentY The Republican
majority on the Ways and Means Committee rejects,
however, "the narrow view that reductions in the taxation of capital gains will benefit primarily higher-income Americans. Traditional attempts to measure the
benefit of a tax reduction for capital gains are deficient."68 Proponents of a capital gains cut claimed that
most capital gains are realized by middle-income taxpayers, some of whom are pushed into high-income
status by the once-in-a-lifetime realization in just one
tax year of gain that has accrued over a number of
years, as in the case of a retirement sale of a s mall

66CWATRA Effects on Receipts, supra note 52.
67Jd.

68H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 2, at 36. Chair Bill Archer,
R-Texas, went further in the floor debate: "The Treasury
figures are so distorted that they are not credible. They were
exposed as being noncredible in our committee when the
Treasury witness was before us. Imputing rental incomes to
somebody that owns thei r own home and saying that is income to you, this is ridiculous. These figures are just not
credible." 141 Congo Rec. H 4215 (House April 5, 1995 Daily
Ed.) (Remarks of Chair Bill Archer, R-Texas); see Eric Pianin
and Dan Morgan, "Tax-Cut Passed by House Committee;
Democrats Appear to Be Making Inroads With Charge That
GOP Bill Favors Wealthy," Washington Post A-4, col. 1, col. 4
(Wed. March 15, 1995) (According to Archer, Treasury's distributions "grossly overstate the number of families in the
upper-income brackets benefiting from the proposed tax
breaks ." ). Assistant Secretary of Treasury Leslie Samuels
pOinted out that imputed rental income was a small part of
"family economic income." Unofficial Transcript of the House
Ways and Mean s Hearing on the Republican Contract, January
10, 1995,95 TNT 12-76 Oanuary 19,1995). The bigger ticket
items, also more consistent with Haig-Simons concepts, are
accrual of capital gains appreciation and imputation of corporate taxes according to ownership of capital. Jane Gravelle,
Senior Specialist in Economic Policy Congressional Research
Services, Distributional Effects of Tax Provisions in the Contract
With America As Reported by the Ways and Mean s Committee
(April 3, 1995) OCT 1995 tables based on cash flow and unlike
in prior years post-behavioral effects distribution; while
Treasury measures are more consistent with standard economic measures of economic income and static realizations),
95 TNT 66-33 (April 5, 1995) ("CRS Distributional Effects" );
Gene Steuerle, "The Distribu tional Effects of Tax Changes,"
Tax Notes, Mar. 27, 1995, p. 2027 at 2028.
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business, farm or residence. 69 This is the "king-for-aday" myth.
In 1990 then Rep. (now Sen.) Byron Dorgan, D-N.D.,
asked the Joint Committee on Taxation Staff to make a
time-series study of a sample of capital gains realizations/ o which demonstrated that the 43.7 percent of the
individual taxpayers in the sample who realized capital gains only once in the five-year period surveyed
(1979-83) had an average capital gain of $2,000 and
:eal.iz.ed onl~ 9.8 percent of all capital gains realized by
IOdlvlduals 10 the period. On the other hand, the 15.7
percent. of the indivi~uals who realized capital gains
10 all five years reahzed an average capital gain of
$100,000 and 58.9 percent of total capital gains realized
over the period. Those who realized such gains in at
least four years out of the five-year period recognized
70? percent of the total dollar value of reported capital
galns. 71 The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
concluded in 1995 that "[hligher-income taxpayers
generally hold a larger proportion of corporate stock
and other capital assets than do other taxpayers. Thus,
while many taxpayers may benefit from an exclusion
or indexing for capital gains, a larger proportion of the
dollar value of any tax reduction will go to those
higher-income taxpayers who realize the bulk of the
dollar value of gains." 72
~ome members of Congress may even believe the
claims that 70 percent of capital assets are held by
taxpayers with no more than $50,000 of AGI and that
s uch taxpayers pay most of the capital gains taxes. 73
69 ~ . R . Rep . .No. 84, supra note 2, at 36, states that many
Amencans realize only one or two capital gains in a lifetime,
e.g., a retirement sale of the family business, which makes
th em appear for the year of sale to be higher income.
Proponents state that this is the usual pattern. Ways and Means
Hearing 0 11 the Republican Contract, January 25, 1995 (Statement
of Rep. Phil English, R-Pa.); Ways and Means Hearing on the
Republican COllt ra ct, January 24, 1995 (Statement of Rep. Wally
Herger, R-Calif.) (va st majority of sales in his district and in
o the~ members' districts); Ways and Means Hearillg 011 the RepubllC.an Contract, January 25, 1995 (Statement of Rep. Jim
Bunnmg, R-Ky.); Senate Hearing on Capital Gains, February 15,
1995 (Statement of Senator Charles Grassley, R-Iowa).
7° 1990 Hou se Hearings on Fairness, supra note 8, at 216
(Statement of Rep. (now Senator) Byron Dorgan, D-N.D.)
(Dorgan asked the Joint Committee to complete a study on
once-in-a-lifetime sales); id. at 217 (Statement of Rep. Andy
Jacobs, ~-Ind.); Id. at 249 (Statement of Senator Bill Brad ley,
D-N.J .); Id. at 248-49 (Statement of Rep. Richard Gephardt,
D-M o. ); Id. at 273 (Statement of Rep. Donald Pease, D-Ohio).
" Methodology 1990, supra note 59, at 48-9; 1990 Senate Tax
incellt ive Hearing s, supra note 53, at 70 (Statement of Thomas
Barthold, staff economist with Joint Committee on Taxation).
The same pattern was reported in Tax Reductions 0/1978, supra
note 3, at 4, 7.
72Capital Gains and Losses 1995, supra note 21, a t 30-1;
accord Ways and Mean s Hearillg on tile Republican Co ntract,
January 24, 1995 (Statement of Dr. Alan Sinai, capital gains
proponent).
7JWay s and Mean s Hearing 01/ tire Republican Cont ract,
January 25, 1995 (Statement of Rep . Ron Wyden, D-Ore.);
HOI/ se Small Bu siness Hearill g on Capital Gains, January 26,
1995 (Stat ement of Chair Jan Meyers, R-Kan.) (70 percent of

(Footnote 73 continued in next column.)
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They are deluded both as to the facts and as to patterns
of wealth in this country. The opposite is more true: 70
percent of the benefits of a capital gains preference are
realized year after year by the same top 10 percent of
families and 50 percent of the capital gains realizations
are enjoyed by the top 1 percent of families with the
bulk of their gains being real and not infla tionary. It
could be no other way taking into account the sources
of capital gains realizations (mostly public stock and
in vestment real estate 74 ) and concentration of ownership of s u ch assets at the top.75
Myth No.6: There Is Substantial Economic
Mobility in the United States so That a
Lower-Income Taxpayer May Be Higher-Income
a Decade Later (and Presumably Realize Her
Share of Capital Gains)
H.R. Rep. No. 84 claimed as a further deficiency in
traditional studies of benefits of a capital gains cut that
they classify taxpayers only by their current economic
condition; studies show that there is substantial economic mobility in the United States so that an individual classified as lower income may be higher income in a decade. 76 "Substantial" income mobility is
another misleading myth. Treasury under the Bush administration, to answer the Democratic charges of the
failure of trickle down economics embodied in the 1978
and 1981 tax cuts, performed mobility studies concluding that as many as one-third of the taxpayers at the
bottom of the income scale in 1979 moved up the scale
during the 1980s and similarly as m any as one-third in
the top 20 percent moved down the income scale

capital gains taxes paid by those with incomes less than
$75,000), 141 Congo Rec. H 4188 (House April 5, 1995 Daily
Ed.) (Remarks of Rep . Jim Ramstad, R-Minn.) (75 percent in
value of capital gains went to taxpayers earning less than
$100,000.) Cj. id at H 4253 (Remarks of Rep. George Gekas,
R-Pa.) ("75 percent of all people who earned $50,000 or less
had an item of capital gains in their tax returns.") (they wish.)
Many capital gains cut proponents misleadingly pointed to
the .fact th?t the large majority of individual returns showing
capital gams (around 70 percent) are filed by middle- and
lower-income taxpayers, ignoring the very low percentage of
realized gains (around 10 percent) that they reported. Ways
and Means Hearing 011 the Republican Contract, January 24,
1995, (Statement of Rep. Philip Crane, R-Ill .); id. January 25,
1995 (Statement of Rep. Jim Bunning, R-Ky.); id. (Statement
of Rep Phil English, R-Pa.); accord 136 Congo Rec. H 6277
(House September 28, 1989 Daily Ed .) (Rep . Bill Archer, RTexas) (75 percent of taxpayers with capital gains had under
$50,000 of other income and high income distribution reflects
onetime gain on sale of house, business or long-held stock).
14See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
15The top 1 percent of families owned 31 percent of
household net worth in 1983 (36 percent in 1989). Anne
Fisher, "The New Debate Over the Very Rkh," Fortune 42,43
(June 29, 1992). Currently the top 1 percent hold 49 percent
of publicly held stock, 62 percent of business assets, 78 percent of bonds and trusts, and 45 percent of nonresidential
real estate. Sylvia Nasar, "Fed Gives New Evidence of 80's
Gains by Rkhest," New York Times A-I, col. 1, at A- 17, col. 2
(Tuesday April 21, 1992).
16H.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 2, at 36.
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during thi s p eriod .77 Much of the apparent upward
mobi lity in income refl ects, however, the young growing older a nd becoming part of a two-working-spouse
household or reaching pea k earning years; downward
mobility, growing old e r and retiring.78 "Although the
p oor can 'ma ke it' in America, and the wealthy can 'fall
from grace' , these events are neither very common nor
more likely to occur today than in the 1970s."79
Myth No.7: Reduction in Capital Gains Leads
To Increased Investment and Thus Greater
Productivity and Higher Wages
The Ways and Means Committee report stressed
as the most important aspect of the benefits of a capital
gai ns cut th a t it would lea d to economic growth

nu.s. Department of the Treasury Office of Tax Analysis,
Household Income Mobility During the 1980s: A Statistical
Assessment Based on Tax Re turn Data (June 1, 1992) ("Treasury, In come Mobility"); see 138 Congo Rec. S 9125 (Senate
June 29, 1992 Daily Ed .) (Remarks of Senator Pe te Domenici,
R· N. M.); see ge nerally Peter Gosselin, "Back to the Future:
Co nserva tives Try to Red eem the Eighties as a Decade of
Success, a.nd a Roadm ap to the Nineties," Boslon Globe p. 77
(S unday May 3, 1992). Treasury asse rted that tracking individ ual membe rs in the inco me q uintiles from 1979 to 1988
in every qui ntile no more than tw o-thirds of those in the
quintile at the beginnin g of the decade were in the same
quintiles at the end ; the sa me pa ttern occurred in the top 1
percent - only 47.3 percent of those in the top 1 percent in
1979 w re still in the top 1 pe rcent in 1988, but 75 percent
were still in the top 5 pe rcent.
78An U rba n Ins titute study on incom e cl ass mobility
released at abo ut the sam e time concludes tha t there has
been some inco me mobility decad e by d ecade, but the d egree of s uch mo bility did not increase during the 19805, and
s uch mobility reflected to a la rge de gree the life cycle of
wor kers. Isabel Sawhill and Mark Condon, Is U.S. In come
Equalily Really Growing? Sorting Oul th e Fairn ess Ques tion
Urban Ins litut e Policy Bi les (June 1992) . The work life cycle
is that "fo r rich and poor a like, ea rnings rise from the time
individ uals ente r the wo rk forc e throug h middle age ro ughly d o ubling, in the average - a nd fall afte r re tiremen t. " Many of the p eople in Treas ury's bottom quintile in
1979 were in fact middle- o r high-income taxpayers s uch as
business peop le or far mers with a ba d yea r, and esp ecially
recen t college grad uates. Indeed, the ave rage age of those
in the bottom [fi rst) q ui ntile in 1979 who had risen to the
top or fif th quintile 10 years la te r was 22; to the middle
class, age 23 . Steve n Mu fso n, "Treas ury's Look at Incom e
Mobi lity; St udy Fue ls Arg ument Ov e r Who Bene fited from
the Reaga n Era," Washi ngton Post A- 17, col. 1, a t col. 3
(Wed nesday, June 3, 1992) (r lyi ng o n Lee Price, a staff
econo mis t with the Joint Eco no mic Committee). Conve rsely
conSide ring, fo r exa m ple, that the med ian age of the to p 1
percent was 53 in 1981, Fis he r, supra note 75, at 44, looking
10 years after 1979 a t those w ho had been in the to p 1
percent of taxpayers the n, the median age w ould be at least
63 and one wo uld expect that a large percentage had retired
and in 1990 therefore had lower incomes.
7'lSawh ill and Condon, supra note 78, quoted in Sylvia
Nasar, "One Stud y'S Rich es, Another's Rags," New York Times
0-1. coJ. 3, at coJ. 5 (Wednesday June 17, 1992).
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benefitting all Americans.8o Again, this experiment has
been tried before and failed. The decline in wages at
the middle and bottom over the past two decades indicates that the benefits of the capital gains cuts of 1978
and 1981 did not trickle down. The 23-percent decrease
in the effective rate at the top due to the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981's 28.5-percent cut in the top
investment income (70 to 50 percent) and top capital
gains rates (28 to 20 percent) in addition to its proportionate 25-percent reduction in the breakpoints for all
income tax brackets (phased in over three years) and
the 6-percent increase in the effective rate at the bottom
due to the 1983 increase in the regressive payroll taxes
only exacerbated the fact that pretax income from 1978
to 1990 increased only at the top (where it almost
doubled primarily due to sr,eculative bubbles in the
stock and real estate markets 1) while income remained
s tagnant at the middle and bottom as average wages
fell and average hours worked by families increased,
both in large part due to a greater percentage of work-

lIOH.R. Rep. No. 84, supra note 2 at 36; accord 138 Congo Rec.
H 575-76 (House February 25, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of
Rep. Dick Armey, R-Texas) (90 percent of benefits of utilization
of capital are workers and as to 10 percent of benefits going
to investors, 69 percent are retired or working Americans who
own capital in their retirement program; 31 percent of public
stock is owned by individuals only half of whom are high
income); id. at H 454 (House February 19, 1992 Daily Ed.).
81 Michael Mandel, "Who'll Get the Uon's Share of Wealth
in the '90s? The Uons," Business Week 86 (June 8, 1992). The
increase in average income of the top quintile of households
was due to the fact that the greatest changes overall were in
the mix of incomes, with greatest increases in capital gains,
dividend and interest incomes. The middle's share of these
kinds of incomes remained low. The median after-tax income
of the top 1 percent of hou seholds increased 94 pe rcent to
over $500,000 from 1978 to 1990, but the telling statistics are
that the rich's income from capital gains increased 171 perce nt and their dollar incre ase in interes t inc ome approximated the dollar increase in capital gains. Matthew
Cooper and Dorian Friedman, "The Rich in Ame rica," U.S.
News & World Report 34, 35 (November 18, 1991) (212-percent
increase in executive pay); Sylvia Nasar, "Fed Gives New
Evidence of 80's Gains for the Wealthiest," New York Times
A-1. col. 1, at A-I7, col. 1 (Tuesday April 21, 1992); Edwin
Ruben ste in, "lime to Get Back to Reaganomics," New York
Times Section 3, p . 13, col. 2, at co l. 4 (Sunday July 26, 1992).
Fede ra l Reserve Chair Alan G reensp a n testified tha t the
1980s we re the first great speculative boom (people and institutions acquired with debt asse ts based on expectations of
the ir future growth in value, now the values have d eclined)
s ince World War II. Hearing on Federal Reserve's Second
Monetary Policy Report for 1992 before the Senate Comm . on
Banking, Hou sing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 70
(1992) (Statement of Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan).
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ing spouses.52 Contrary to the extreme rhetoric,S3 the
trickle down economics cuts did not ca use the pretax
income disparities,84 but they did make the after-tax
disparities even wider.
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.2Progressivity and Income Distribution, sl/pm note 4, at 2-4,
12- 13; Tax Policy and the Macroeconomy, supra note 4 at 5, 29-30,

55; Paul Taylor, "Tax Policy as Political Battleground,"
Washington Post A- 1 Col. 1 (February 18, 1990); See generally
M. Kaus, The End of Eqlwlity 29-32 (BasicBooks 1992); T. Edsall
& M. Edsall, Chain Reaction 159-65, 219-20 (W.w. Norton & Co.
1991) (distributional effect by political affiliation). J. Schor, The
Overworked American 19-22, 25-6, 29-34, 39-41, 167-74 (BasicBooks 1991), concludes that over the past 20 years the average
number of annual hours increased from 1,786 to 1,949 or 163
hours; as much as 12 percent of the workforce holds 2 jobs. In
1990 nearly 60 percent of mothers with pre-school children
worked and 75 percent of mothers with school-age children
worked. Felicity Barringer, "New Census Data Reveal
Redistribution of Poverty," New York Times A-14, col. 1, at col.
4 (Friday May 29, 1992) . Only 46 percent of mothers with
pre-schoole rs worked in 1980. Barbara Vobejda, "A Nation in
Transition," Washington Post A-I, coil, at A-19, col. 3 (Friday
May 29, 1992). Similarly, during this period per capita income
paradoxically went up 23 percent from 1977 to 1989, but real
family income went up only 8.6 percent with 70 percent of the
growth at the top 1 percent and 95 percent at the top 5 percent.
Paul Krugman, "Disparity and Despair," U.S. News & World
Report 54 (March 23,1992).
83
138 COllg. Rec. S 3385-86 (Senate March 12, 1992 Daily
Ed.) (Remarks of Senator Al Gore, D-Tenn .) ("Middle-income
families have seen their real income go down, a very slight
increase in the top 20 percent, but look at the top 1 percent.
Rea l incomes after taxes and after inflation adjustment have
gone up 136 percent. That is fine if it docs not come at the
expense of th e rest of the country, but what we have done is
we have increa sed , more than doubled the income of the top
wealthiest 1 percent by taking money away from middle-income Americans."); see also id. at H 620-21 (House February
26, 1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Rep . Jim Moody, D-Wis.)
("the tax bill of 1981 and a number of subsequent measures
produced what has generally been acknowledged to have
been the most massive redistribution of wealth in this nation ." ).
S4The pretax changes in income appear due to increased
pay for skills (particularly those attained through education),
which in turn may reflect to some degree the globalization
of the economy with the economic principle of "factor price
equalization" coming into play according to MIT Professor
L. Thurow, Head to Head 52-3 (William Morrow & Co. 1992);
Economic Report of the Presidellt , 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 101-02,
112-13 (!lou se Doc . 102-177 1992).
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